An Inference Attack on Genomic Data Using Kinship, Complex Correlations, and Phenotype Information.
Individuals (and their family members) share (partial) genomic data on public platforms. However, using special characteristics of genomic data, background knowledge that can be obtained from the Web, and family relationship between the individuals, it is possible to infer the hidden parts of shared (and unshared) genomes. Existing work in this field considers simple correlations in the genome (as well as Mendel's law and partial genomes of a victim and his family members). In this paper, we improve the existing work on inference attacks on genomic privacy. We mainly consider complex correlations in the genome by using an observable Markov model and recombination model between the haplotypes. We also utilize the phenotype information about the victims. We propose an efficient message passing algorithm to consider all aforementioned background information for the inference. We show that the proposed framework improves inference with significantly less information compared to existing work.